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POLLUTION AND CAPITAL TAX COMPETITION 




The paper examines the interaction among taxes on factors income, environmental quality and 
welfare. We construct a two-country regional block model with capital mobility and cross-
border pollution. Pollution in the two countries is simultaneously abated by the private sector, 
in response to a pollution tax and by the public sector utilizing income and pollution tax 
revenue. We demonstrate, among other things, that due to the existence of cross-border 
pollution in many cases the Nash optimal policy on capital income is a positive tax, even if 
taxes on the income of immobile factors are chosen optimally. This tax rate increases with the 
degree of cross-border pollution. 
JEL classification: F15, F18, F22, H21. 
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International capital mobility is one of the key features of the recent wave of globalization.
This was mainly facilitated by the deregulation of national capital markets in an eﬀort to
attract foreign capital. As a result one of the main concerns that have been raised both
in policy debates and in the relevant theoretical literatures is the issue of tax competition.
This refers to a race to the bottom in capital income taxes among countries, in an eﬀort
to attract foreign ﬁrms and capital.
The literature on tax competition largely examines the eﬃciency properties of source-
based capital taxes. In this framework, countries or regions, choose their tax instruments
non-cooperatively, accounting for capital mobility. Three important conclusions emerge
from this literature. First, the Nash equilibrium taxes are such that capital tends to be
under-taxed in the countries or regions involved. Moreover, when governments use this
capital-tax revenue to ﬁnance the provision of local public goods, this under-taxation of
capital leads to an under-provision of public goods.1 Second, if additional distortionary
taxes (e.g., commodity and/or other factor taxes) exist, then the under-taxation of capital
may lead to over-taxation of other commodities and factors (e.g., Bucovetsky and Wilson
(1991)).2 Third, in many cases the Nash optimal policy is a capital income tax for the
capital importing country and a capital income subsidy for the capital exporting country.3
Finally, Bjorvatn and Schjelderup (2002) show that when we have an international public
good with perfect spillovers then there is no capital tax competition.
An extensive literature has also emerged studying the interaction between capital
mobility and the quality of the environment. This literature examines the properties of
the Nash equilibrium pollution taxes and their impact on net pollution and welfare in
the presence of cross-border pollution.4,5
1See Zodrow and Mieszkowski (1986), Gordon and Wilson (1986) and Wilson (1986).
2Other related, but not directly relevant, issues of this literature include the strategic choice of
government expenditure as opposed to tax rates (e.g., Wildasin (1988), Hoyt (1993)), the taxation
of mobile capital within the context of optimal income tax models (e.g., Huber (1999)), and ﬁscal
competition among countries of unequal size within the context of imperfect competition (e.g. Hauﬂer
and Wooton (1999)).
3See for example DePater and Myers (1994), Hatzipanayotou, Hadjiyiannis, and Michael (2002) and
Peralta and Van Ypersele (2003).
4Another strand of the literature examines the welfare and policy implications of cross-border pollution
in the absence of capital mobility, e.g., Markusen (1975), Copeland and Taylor (1995), Ludema and
Wooton (1997).
5Merriﬁeld (1988) in a two-country general equilibrium model with international ﬂows of goods,
capital and pollution shows that higher pollution taxes may actually have an adverse eﬀect on the levels
of pollution emissions. Copeland (1994) shows that in the absence of cross-border pollution in a small
open economy pollution policy reforms entail greater welfare gains when capital is internationally mobileTo the best of our knowledge, however, very few studies examine the interactions
between taxes on factors’ income, the quality of the environment and welfare. Chao
and Yu (1997) examine the welfare eﬀects of changes in capital income taxes and envi-
ronmental standards in the context of a single economy with capital mobility and local
pollution. They demonstrate, among other things, that the ranking of the weights of
the government objectives determine the optimal capital tax/subsidy and the stringency
of environmental standards. Rauscher (1997) examines this interaction in a single com-
modity, two-country model with capital mobility and cross-border pollution but from the
point of view of a single country. He shows that the optimal policy for capital incomes
is a tax (subsidy) for the capital importing (exporting) country. In addition he shows
that capital moves to the country with less stringent environmental regulations and that
global pollution may rise or fall. Kim and Wilson (1997) develop a model with many
identical countries, capital mobility and local pollution, where governments use taxes on
mobile and immobile factors’ income to provide public goods. They ﬁnd that public
goods are underprovided and that countries engage in a race to the bottom in environ-
mental standards. They argue that the race to the bottom is more important in terms
of welfare than the underprovision of public goods.
Our goal is to analyze the interactions between income taxes, the quality of the
environment and welfare but in a more general model of a two-country regional block
with capital mobility, cross-border pollution and public pollution abatement.6 In our
analysis we assume that pollution taxes are exogenously given. Our model resembles
the situation in the European Union (EU), where there are uniform minimum pollution
taxes for mineral fuels including oil products, natural gas, electricity and coal. At
the same time EU members are free to chose their capital and other income taxes as
long as they do not discriminate between domestic and foreign capital. Within this
framework, we examine the eﬀects of capital and immobile factors’ income taxes on public
sector abatement activity and on net pollution. We, then, examine how the existence of
cross-border pollution and public pollution abatement aﬀect the Nash equilibrium capital
income taxes. We ﬁnd, among other things, that in many cases, the Nash optimal policy
is a tax on capital income and that, under reasonable assumptions, this tax increases
than when it is not.
6Ample evidence from OECD statistics attest to the role undertaken by several governments in abating
pollution. For example, in the early 1990s the share of public sector abatement of air pollution in the UK
and the Netherlands was 30% and 50% respectively, while in the US was 6%. Moreover, Brett and Keen
(2000) provide evidence for the US whereby environmental tax revenues are earmarked for environmental
related public sector expenditures.
2w i t ht h ed e g r e eo fc r o s s - b o r d e rp o l l u t i o n . W ea l s os h o wt h a tw h e nt h et w oc o u n t r i e s
are identical in every respect and the degree of cross-border pollution is at its maximum,
then the Nash optimal taxes on capital and immobile factors incomes are the same.
2 The Model
We develop a general equilibrium model of a two country Regional Block (RB). The two
countries, we call Home and Foreign, are assumed to be small in world commodity markets
and they trade freely with each other and the rest of the World.7 Commodity prices
are, therefore, constant and equal to the World prices. We assume that each country
comprises of identical individuals. In both countries, production generates pollution that
aﬀects the utility of the residents in the two countries. In other words, pollution generated
in one country aﬀects negatively the utility of local residents and, through cross-border
emissions, the utility of the other country’s residents. We assume that capital is inter-RB
mobile, but completely immobile between the RB and the rest of the World. Moreover,
we designate Home as the capital-importing country and Foreign as the capital-exporting
one. All other factors of production are assumed inter-RB and internationally immobile.
Next we proceed to construct the model of Home while the model of Foreign follows
analogously. The country’s maximum value of production of private goods is denoted





x − tz :( x,z,K) ∈ Φ(v,K)}, (1)
where p is the vector of exogenously given world commodity prices, Φ(v,K) is the coun-
try’s aggregate technology set and v is the endowment vector of the immobile factors.
Also, K = K + kf where K is Home’s domestic endowment of capital and kf is the
amount of foreign capital employed in Home and, therefore, K is the domestic supply of
capital. The vector of net outputs is denoted by x, t i st h ee m i s s i o n st a xr a t e ,a n dz is the
amount of pollution generated by production, net of the amount abated by the private
sector.8 Since p and v are invariant for the rest of the analysis, the revenue function can
7Foreign’s variables are denoted by an asterisk.
8For simplicity we assume only one type of pollutant generated in all sectors. A prime (0) denotes
a transposed vector or matrix, and p
0
x − tz is the value of factor income. Finally, Φ(v,K) includes
production technologies and abatement technologies in various private sectors, as they carry out some
pollution abatement in response to the emission tax (t).
3be written as R(t,K). We assume that the R(t,K) function is strictly concave in K (i.e.,
RKK < 0) and strictly convex in t (i.e., Rtt > 0). Strict convexity in t implies that
pollution emissions by the private sector are reduced, as the pollution tax, t, increases.
By the envelop theorem, RK is the marginal revenue product of capital and the level of
pollution, z, generated by the private sector is given by9
z = −Rt(t,K). (2)
We assume that in both countries pollution is capital intensive (i.e., RtK < 0 and
R∗
t∗K∗ < 0). In addition to the pollution abatement carried-out by the private sector in
response to the emissions tax, (t), the government provides public pollution abatement
ﬁnanced by tax revenue. This is done by importing a pollution abatement good from the
rest of the World at the price Pg. Therefore, net pollution, after accounting for private
and public sector abatement activities and cross-border pollution is given by
r = z − g + Θ(z
∗ − g
∗), (3)
where Θ ∈ [0,1] is the degree of cross-border pollution, g is the level of local public
pollution abatement and z∗ and g∗ represent the level of pollution and the level of public
abatement in Foreign, respectively.10 We assume that the government imposes pollution
taxes, at a rate t, capital income taxes, at a rate ρ and taxes on the income of all other
factors, at a rate µ, and uses the tax revenues solely for the provision of public pollution
abatement activity (i.e., Pgg).11 Note that capital income taxes are the same for domestic
and foreign capital as required by the EU. Assuming a balanced budget for the public
sector, the government’s budget constraint is given by
Pgg = µR(t,K)+( ρ − µ)KRK(t,K) − tRt(t,K). (4)
The relevant literature, by and large, assumes that lump-sum taxes and occasionally
capital income taxes are used to ﬁnance the provision of public goods (in this case public
9Copeland (1994) and Turunen-Red and Woodland (1998) among others deﬁne pollution in the same
way.
10Equation (3) implicitly assumes that there is only one pollutant in both countries.
11We assume that all tax revenue is earmarked for ﬁnancing the public sector’s pollution abatement
activity. Alternatively, it could be assumed that only a fraction of this revenue is used for this purpose
and the rest is used for other purposes by the government. This speciﬁcation signiﬁcantly complicates
the analysis without adding much to the results.
4pollution abatement). In reality, however, governments rely more on income taxes rather
than on lump-sum taxes to ﬁnance public sector activities. For these reasons, this paper
considers income taxes on capital and on all immobile factors.
Turning to the demand side, we assume that all households are identical and, as
previously noted, utility is adversely aﬀected by domestic and Foreign generated pollution
transmitted across borders. Let E(u,r) denote the minimum expenditure required to
achieve a level of utility, u, given a level of net pollution, r.T h e r e f o r e , Eu,n o r m a l i z e d
to equal one, denotes the inverse of the marginal utility of income. Similarly, Er is the
marginal damage to consumers from pollution (as in Copeland (1994)). Alternatively,
Er can be interpreted as the marginal willingness to pay for a reduction in pollution as
in Chao and Yu (1999). Er is positive, since a higher level of pollution needs to be
compensated with a higher level of consumption of private goods to maintain a given
level of utility.
We complete Home’s model by stating the households’ budget constraint. It requires
that private spending E(u,r) must equal after tax factor income from the production of
goods minus repatriated earnings of Foreign’s capital employed in Home. The income-
expenditure identity for Home can be written as:
E(u,r)=( 1− µ)R(t,K)+( µ − ρ)KRK(t,K) − (1 − ρ)k
fRK(t,K). (5)

















































where r∗ is the level of total net pollution in Foreign, P∗
g∗ is the price of the imported
pollution abatement good, Θ∗ i st h er a t eo fc r o s s - b o r d e rp o l l u t i o ni n t ot h a tc o u n t r ya n d
K∗ is the supply of capital in Foreign.12 Note that by the assumptions of the model
dK = dkf = −dK∗.
12We assume that P∗
g∗could be diﬀerent from Pg. This is a more general set-up and does not exclude
t h ec a s ew h e r et h et w oa r ee q u a l .
5Finally, perfect capital mobility within the RB and no capital mobility between the
RB and the rest of the World requires that the net return to capital in the two countries
is equalized. Therefore, equilibrium in the RB’s capital market requires that






The system of equations (2)-(10) contains nine endogenous variables, namely u, u∗, g,
g∗, z, z∗, r, r∗ and K; six policy parameters, namely (t,µ,ρ) and (t∗,µ ∗,ρ ∗); and four
exogenous parameters, namely (Pg,Θ) and (P∗
g∗,Θ∗). Substituting equations (2) and (3)
into (5) and equations (6) and (7) into (9), the original system reduces to a ﬁve-equations
system, in terms of the unknowns (u, u∗, g, g∗,a n dK), which comprises of the modiﬁed
equations (5), (9) and equations (4), (8), and (10). Some of the comparative statics of
this system appear in Appendix A. For the rest of the analysis we assume that pollution
taxes t and t∗ are exogenously given.13 This assumption is realistic for the EU case where
minimum pollution taxes are set at the regional level and are not optimally chosen by
member countries.
3 Capital Mobility, Income Taxes and Public Abate-
ment
In this section we examine how changes in income taxes and capital mobility aﬀect public
sector pollution abatement in Home and Foreign. Using Appendix A and equations (4)





































where H =( 1− ρ)RKK +( 1− ρ∗)R∗




indicating that raising Home’s capital income tax rate causes a capital outﬂow from
13Hadjiyiannis, Hatzipanayotou, and Michael (2002) examine the interaction among pollution taxes,
capital mobility, cross-border pollution and public sector abatement activities.
6the country and thus a capital inﬂow in Foreign.14 Equation (11) indicates that the
eﬀect of raising ρ on Home’s public abatement g, is the combination of two revenue
eﬀects through the country’s government budget constraint. The ﬁrst, (∂g/∂ρ),i sa
positive revenue eﬀect indicating that the higher ρ,g i v e nK, leads to an increase in
capital income tax revenue which in turn raises g. The second, (∂g/∂K)(dK/dρ),i sa n
ambiguous tax revenue eﬀect due to the inter-RB capital mobility. Through this eﬀect
the higher ρ, which reduces Home’s K,a ﬀects tax revenues and thus the level of g,i na
number of ways. First, since pollution is capital intensive, the decrease in capital leads
to a decrease in the pollution tax revenue, (−P−1
g H−1tRtKRK). Second, the decrease
in capital reduces the amount of capital tax revenue since the tax applies to a smaller
stock of Home’s capital, (P−1
g H−1ρR2
K). Third, the decrease in capital decreases income
to all other factors, (R − KRK), and, therefore, the tax revenue from those incomes by
−P−1
g H−1µKRKKRK.15 These three eﬀects combined lead to a reduction in g due to
the higher capital income tax ρ. However, a fourth eﬀect, P−1
g H−1ρKRKKK,e n t a i l sa n
increase in capital tax revenue, thus an increase in g. That is, the tax induced reduction
in K increases its domestic rate of return RK, and, therefore, it raises government tax
revenue and the provision of public abatement. Overall, an increase in ρ entails an
ambiguous eﬀect on g.
By setting (dg/dρ)=0in (11) we derive the tax rate ρ that maximizes the public
sector’s abatement activity as:16
e ρ = R
−1
K [tRtK − (1 − ρ
∗)KR
∗
K∗K∗ − (1 − µ)KRKK]. (13)
From equation (13) we derive the following proposition:
Proposition 1 Under the conditions of the model and for t ≈ 0 (suﬃcient but not
necessary condition), there exists a positive capital income tax rate that maximizes the
public sector’s pollution abatement activity.
Equation (12) gives the eﬀect of an increase in ρ on Foreign’s public sector’s abatement
activities, g∗. In this case, there is no direct eﬀect, and thus the impact of an increase
in Home’s capital tax rate on Foreign’s level of public abatement is entirely through the
14The expressions for (∂g/∂ρ) and (∂g/∂K) are given by diﬀerentiating equation (4) and (∂g∗/∂K)
by totally diﬀerentiating equation (8).
15This is because the decrease in capital makes all other factors relatively more abundant.
16This is equivalent to deriving the revenue maximizing capital income tax rate.
7indirect revenue eﬀect in Foreign due to capital mobility. The terms of this indirect
revenue eﬀect are the same four as those described above for Home. The only diﬀerence
is that an increase in ρ increases the capital stock, K∗, in Foreign and, therefore, these
terms have the opposite signs. Clearly, in the absence of capital mobility, changes
in Home capital income taxes do not aﬀect Foreign’s public pollution abatement (i.e.,
dg∗/dρ =0 ). With capital mobility, however, the overall eﬀect of the higher ρ on g∗ is
again ambiguous. The following Proposition states suﬃcient conditions to resolve this
ambiguity.
Proposition 2 Under the conditions of the model, suﬃcient but not necessary, condi-
tions for an increase in Home’s capital income tax rate to raise Foreign’s public sector
abatement (e.g.,
dg∗
dρ > 0)a r e
1) ρ∗ ≤ µ∗,o r






¯ ¯ ¯ ≤ 1.
The intuition behind Proposition 2 is as follows. An increase in ρ results in a capital
inﬂow in Foreign. As a result of that the marginal revenue product of capital in that
country falls, while the marginal revenue product of immobile factors increases. There-
fore, tax revenues from capital incomes decrease and tax revenues from immobile factors
increase. If the former eﬀect is greater than the latter (i.e. ρ∗ ≤ µ∗), overall revenues
increase and g∗ increases. Alternatively, if the capital elasticity of the marginal revenue
product in Foreign is small, then the capital inﬂow raises capital income tax revenue and
thus g∗. Similar results hold for the eﬀects of changes in Foreign’s capital income tax ρ∗
on g and g∗. Appendix A shows the corresponding eﬀects for ρ∗.
Next we turn to the eﬀects of changes in taxes on the income of immobile factors on
the provision of public sector abatement. Using Appendix A we get that the eﬀect of














The only impact of an increase in µ on g is the positive direct eﬀect.17 In other words, an
17From Appendix A, dK
dµ = dK
dµ∗ =0 . That is, capital does not respond to changes in the income tax
rate of the immobile and inelastically supplied factors.
8increase in µ transfers a larger part of non-capital income (R−KRK)t ot h eg o v e r n m e n t
in the form of tax revenue. Also, since an increase in µ does not aﬀect capital mobility





4 Taxes, Net Pollution and Welfare
In this section we examine the eﬀects of raising capital and non-capital income taxes
(ρ,µ)a n d( ρ∗,µ ∗) on net pollution in the two countries (r and r∗) and on their respective
levels of national welfare (u and u∗). The main purpose of this section is to highlight
the fact that income taxes have an impact on the environment and in setting these taxes
governments should account for these externalities.
4.1 Income Taxes and Net Pollution
We begin the analysis of this section by examining the eﬀects of higher taxes on immobile


























.( 1 7 )



















.( 1 9 )
9Equations (16) and (18) indicate that a higher µ,l o w e r sn e tp o l l u t i o nb o t hi nH o m ea n d
Foreign. Intuitively, in Home, an increase in µ transfers income from immobile factors
to the government which uses it to ﬁnance more public pollution abatement, lowering
net pollution. In the presence of cross-border pollution, lower net pollution in Home
causes lower net pollution in Foreign. In the case where Θ∗ =0 ,ah i g h e rt a xµ has
no eﬀect on Foreign’s r∗. A similar reasoning applies to the eﬀect of a higher (µ∗) on r
and r∗ as captured by equations (17) and (19). A ﬁnal note is in order regarding the
interaction between taxes on immobile factors income and the quality of the environment.
This interaction exists due to the assumption that tax revenues from immobile factors
income are used for public pollution abatement. Alternatively, if we assume lump-sum
distribution of these tax revenues to consumers these interactions cease to exist.
Next we derive the eﬀects of higher capital income taxes (ρ and ρ∗) on net pollution
in the two countries. From equations (3), (7), (11) and (12) the eﬀect of a higher capital






































where, ∆ = HP∗
g∗Pg and is negative. Equation (20) indicates that the eﬀect of the
higher ρ on r emerges through its impact on capital mobility and on the provision of
public pollution abatement in the two countries. As depicted by the above equation, this
eﬀect is generally ambiguous. Equation (39) of Appendix A demonstrates the analogous
ambiguous eﬀect of the higher ρ on net pollution, r∗,i nF o r e i g n .
From equations (20), (11) and (12) note that in the absence of capital mobility dr/dρ <
0 since the impact of capital income taxes on net pollution is only through the direct
eﬀect on public pollution abatement, i.e. ∂g/∂ρ.
Setting (dr/dρ)=0gives the net pollution minimizing rate of the capital income tax
as:
























10One could argue that the value of analyzing b ρ is limited since governments hardly ever
use income taxes as environmental policy instruments. However, b ρ,i so fs o m ei n t e r e s t
since it represents the choice of a government that is solely interested in minimizing net
pollution. Equation (21) indicates that if Θ =0 , then the net pollution minimizing
capital income tax rate is positive provided that Pg ≥ t. If, on the other hand, Θ > 0,
then the suﬃcient but not necessary conditions for b ρ>0 are: i) Pg ≥ t, P∗
g∗ ≤ t∗,a n d
ρ∗ ≤ µ∗ or ii) Pg = P∗
g∗, RtK = R∗
t∗K∗ , t = t∗, ρ∗ ≤ µ∗ and Pg ≥ t.18 The following
proposition states these results.
Proposition 3 The net pollution minimizing capital income tax rate, b ρ, is positive if
1) Θ =0and Pg ≥ t or
2) Θ > 0, Pg ≥ t, P∗
g∗ ≤ t∗,a n dρ∗ ≤ µ∗ or
3) Θ > 0,Pg = P∗
g∗, RtK = R∗
t∗K∗, t = t∗, ρ∗ ≤ µ∗ and Pg ≥ t.
From proposition 3, it is clear that if the two countries are identical in every respect
and Pg = t, then the conditions in part 3 of the proposition are satisﬁed.19 Therefore,
in this case there exists a positive net pollution minimizing capital income tax rate.
4.2 Income Taxes and Welfare
In this section we examine the welfare implications of small changes in income taxes
in the two countries. We ﬁrst analyze the situation in Home and we then infer the
analogous results for Foreign. Before, however, getting into the actual welfare analysis of
this section, it is worth noting some benchmark results useful for the analysis to follow.
Diﬀerentiating (5), and recalling that by assumption dt = dt∗ =0 ,w eg e t
du = −[Er(ΘR
∗
t∗K∗ − RtK) − (µ − ρ)KRKK +( 1− ρ)k
fRKK]dK
− [(K − k
f)RK]dρ − (R − KRK)dµ + Erdg + ΘErdg
∗. (22)
From equation (22) we get that an increase in Home’s public pollution abatement (dg > 0)
increases welfare by Er,t h em a r g i n a lb e n e ﬁt of reducing pollution. Similarly an increase
in Foreign’s public abatement (dg∗ > 0) increases welfare by ΘEr,r e ﬂecting the fact that
18It is reasonable to assume that Pg = P∗
g∗ since both countries import this good, possibly at the same
World price. Also, t = t∗ includes the case with no pollution taxes and thus it is not necessarily a
symmetry condition.
19As we will see in section 5.3 when the two countries are identical and Pg = t we get ρN ≤ µ.
11one unit of pollution in Foreign results in the transfer of Θ units of pollution in Home.
Capital mobility aﬀects welfare in two ways: (i) through the induced change in the level of
gross pollution in Home and Foreign. Since pollution is assumed to be capital intensive,
gross pollution rises in Home, the capital importing country, and falls in Foreign, the
capital exporting one. As a result, capital mobility through the term −Er(ΘR∗
t∗k∗ −Rtk)
entails an ambiguous impact on Home’s welfare, and (ii) through changes in the rate
of return to capital and other factors of production. Changes in factor returns aﬀect
government tax revenue (i.e., (µ − ρ)KRKK) and net repatriated capital earnings to
Foreign (i.e., −(1 − ρ)kfRKK), thus aﬀecting Home’s private real incomes. Both eﬀects
are ambiguous, therefore rendering an ambiguous overall impact on domestic welfare.
N e x t ,n o t et h a ta ni n c r e a s ei nt h ec a p i t a lt a xr a t e ,ρ, reduces capital income available
for consumption of private goods net of repatriated earnings by (K − kf)RK and thus
it reduces welfare. Similarly, an increase in the non-capital income tax rate, µ, reduces
income available for consumption by (R − KRK) and thus it reduces welfare.
We now proceed to a more detailed examination of the eﬀects of income taxes (µ,ρ)
and (µ∗,ρ ∗) on their national welfare levels. From the system of equations in Appendix







where Sg = Er − Pg.W e d e ﬁne the public abatement good as under-provided (over-
provided) when Sg is positive (negative). The public abatement good is optimally pro-












g∗. Equations (23) and (24) indicate that an increase in the tax on
income of the immobile factors simply redistributes funds between these factors and the
government. The marginal beneﬁt of this is the marginal utility of pollution clean-up,
i.e., Er in Home and E∗
r∗ in Foreign. The marginal cost is the value of private goods
forgone, Pg in Home and P∗
g∗ in Foreign.
In examining the welfare eﬀects of capital taxes we ﬁr s td e r i v et h ei m p a c to fa n



























































Equation (25) indicates that a higher capital income tax ρ aﬀects Home’s welfare through
three channels. First it entails a direct negative eﬀect (∂u
∂ρ), as noted by the discussion
of equation (22). A second eﬀect, we call domestic public abatement eﬀect, i.e., Er(
dg
dρ),
exerts a positive impact on welfare under the conditions of Proposition 1. The last eﬀect,




dρ , comprises two terms; a direct
capital-mobility eﬀect, i.e., ∂u
∂K
dK
dρ , and an indirect one due to cross-border pollution and




dρ . This latter eﬀect exerts an ambiguous
impact on Home’s welfare.20 Therefore, the overall eﬀect of the higher ρ on Home’s
w e l f a r ei sa m b i g u o u s .










































































r∗[(ρ − µ)KRKK + ρRK]. (26)
The interpretation of equation (26) is analogous to that of equation (25).
20There is an extensive literature on the welfare implications of capital income taxes (e.g. Huber
(1999)). However, most of this literature ignores public pollution abatement and cross-border pollution.






135 Nash Equilibrium Income Taxes
In this section we derive the equilibrium taxes on capital and non-capital incomes (i.e.,
µ, ρ, µ∗ and ρ∗), assuming that Home and Foreign choose these tax rates simultaneously.
We ﬁrst derive the Nash equilibrium tax rates on immobile factors’ income. Setting
(du/dµ)=0in equation (23) and (du∗/dµ∗)=0in equation (24) we get that the Nash
equilibrium income tax rates µN and µ∗N require that Sg = S∗
g∗ =0 .21 In other words, the
Nash equilibrium tax rates µN and µ∗N lead to the optimal provision of public pollution
abatement from the local point of view. Note that the tax revenue generated by µN
and µ∗N simply represents a transfer of income from immobile factors to the government,
which uses it solely for the provision of public pollution abatement.
To proceed with the derivation of the Nash optimal capital income taxes, we ﬁrst
derive the reaction functions for these taxes by setting (du/dρ)=0in equation (25) and
(du∗/dρ∗)=0in equation (26). Since, µ and µ∗ are chosen optimally, as described
above, we account for the fact that public pollution abatement is optimally provided in
both countries (i.e., Sg = S∗
g∗ =0 ). These reaction functions are given by
ρ = −R
−1

























































g [(ρ − µ)KRKK + ρRK].( 2 8 )
The Nash equilibrium tax rates are the solutions to the system of equations (27) and (28).
Appendix B describes how these Nash tax rates are derived. The general solutions for
ρN and ρ∗N are very complicated and are not presented here. In general, even if taxes
on immobile factor incomes are chosen optimally (resulting in Sg = S∗
g∗ =0 )a n dPg = t
and P∗
g∗ = t∗ the Nash capital income tax rates are not zero.22 We proceed by examining
21Sg = S∗
g∗ =0is the Samuelson rule for the optimal provision of public goods. In other words, this
condition equates the marginal willingness to pay for the public good, (Er for Home and E∗
r∗ for Foreign)
with the marginal cost of providing it (Pg for Home and P∗
g∗ for Foreign).
22Hadjiyiannis, Hatzipanayotou, and Michael (2002), in the absence of capital income taxes, show that
14some special cases.
5.1 kf =0and Θ = Θ∗ =0
In this benchmark case, the only interaction between Home and Foreign is the one em-
anating from the RB’s capital market. In this case we assume that the two countries
have identical factor endowments and technologies and as a result, no foreign capital is
employed in Home, i.e., kf =0 .23 A tt h es a m et i m e ,t h e r ei sn oc r o s s - b o r d e rp o l l u t i o n
since Θ = Θ∗ =0 . Therefore, from equations (27) and (28) we get that the Nash capital














Since there are no interactions between the two countries their choice of capital income
tax does not depend directly on the tax choice of the other country. Each country’s
optimal capital income tax rate is positive, if the price of the imported public abatement
good exceeds its own pollution tax rate. That is, ρN > 0,i fPg >tin Home and ρ∗N > 0,
if P∗
g∗ >t ∗ in Foreign.24
5.2 kf =0and Θ > 0, Θ∗ =0or Θ =0 , Θ∗ > 0
First we allow for cross-border pollution from Foreign to Home but not the other way
around, i.e., Θ > 0 and Θ∗ =0 . W ec o n t i n u et oa s s u m et h a tt h et w oc o u n t r i e sh a v e
identical factor endowments and technologies and thus no foreign capital is employed in
Home, i.e., kf =0 . Foreign’s Nash capital income tax rate is that given by equation (30).
in general Nash pollution taxes can be greater or smaller than the cost of public pollution abatement.
However, in the special case where the two countries are identical and lump-sum taxes are chosen
optimally, then Pg = tN and P∗
g∗ = t∗N.
23In this case, preferences could be diﬀerent since prices are exogenously given because of free trade
with the rest of the World.
24Note that in this case, where Θ = Θ∗ =0and kf =0 , if pollution tax rates (t and t∗)a r e
optimally set, then one possible equilibrium is Pg = tN, P∗
g∗ = t∗N and ρN = ρ∗N
=0(see Hadjiyiannis,
Hatzipanayotou, and Michael (2002)). Kim and Wilson (1997) also ﬁnd that Nash capital income taxes
are zero in the absence of cross-border pollution and when countries are identical.


















K∗K∗).( 3 1 )
T h eN a s hc a p i t a li n c o m et a xi ne q u a t i o n( 3 1 )i sh i g h e rt h a nt h a ti ne q u a t i o n( 2 9 )i f
P∗
g∗ ≤ t∗ (suﬃcient but not necessary condition), and it could be lower if P∗
g∗ >t ∗.
Similarly, if we allow for one-way cross-border pollution from Home to Foreign, Home’s
















g ( RtK[Pg − t]+µKRKK).( 3 2 )
From equation (32) note that the Nash capital tax is higher than that in equation (30) if
Pg ≤ t (suﬃcient but not necessary condition). If, however, Pg >t ,t h e ni ti sp o s s i b l ef o r
that rate to be lower. From the above analysis we conclude that in this case if in each
country the pollution tax is equal to the cost of the public pollution abatement good,
the Nash capital income policy for the country suﬀering from cross-border pollution is a
positive tax. Intuitively, in the presence of cross-border pollution the Nash optimal policy
calls for a tax on capital to reduce net pollution. The following Proposition summarizes
the results when the two countries have identical factor endowments and technologies
and no or one-way cross-border pollution.
Proposition 4 Under the conditions of the model:
1) if kf =0and Θ = Θ∗ =0 ,t h e nρN ≥ 0 if Pg ≥ t,a n dρ∗N ≥ 0 if P∗
g∗ ≥ t∗,
2) if kf =0 , Θ∗ =0and Θ > 0, then Foreign’s Nash capital income tax rate is the
same as in (1); ρ
Nis greater than the rate under (1) if P∗
g∗ ≤ t∗.A l s o , ρ
N > 0 if Pg = t
and P∗
g∗ = t∗.
3) if kf =0 , Θ =0and Θ∗ > 0, then Home’s Nash capital income tax rate is the
same as in (1); ρ∗Nis greater than the rate under (1) if Pg ≤ t.A l s o , ρ∗N > 0 if Pg = t
and P∗
g∗ = t∗.
5.3 kf =0 , Θ > 0 and Θ∗ > 0
In this case, we allow for two-way cross-border pollution while continuing to assume that
the two countries have identical endowments and technologies and, therefore, kf =0 .
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where Ω = RK[1 − ΘΘ∗(1 +  ∗)(1 +  )] and Ω∗ = R∗
K∗[1 − ΘΘ∗(1 +  ∗)(1 +  )] and are
both positive by the stability of the Nash equilibrium. The suﬃcient, but not necessary,
conditions for ρN > 0 are Pg ≥ t, P∗
g∗ ≤ t∗ and | ∗| ≤ 1. Similarly, the suﬃcient
conditions for ρ∗N > 0 are P∗
g∗ ≥ t∗, Pg ≤ t and | | ≤ 1.
An interesting special case arises when the two countries are identical in all respects,
that is, in addition to identical endowments and technologies, preferences are also iden-
tical, Pg = P∗





∗ + Θ (1 − Θ
∗)][Pg − t] −
Θµ (1 + Θ∗(1 +  ))
1 − ΘΘ∗(1 +  )2 (35)
From equation (35) we get that ρN = ρ∗N = µ = µ∗ when Θ = Θ∗ =1 .26 Note that
this Nash optimal tax rate is lower than the net pollution minimizing capital income rate
given by (21).27 If, however, Θ = Θ∗ 6=1and Pg = t, we get that the Nash capital income





1 − Θ(1 +  )
. (36)
Note that under the same assumptions the Nash taxes in the benchmark case in section
5.1, where Θ = Θ∗ =0 ,a r eρN = ρ∗N =0 . Equation (36) shows that there is a
25To facilitate the derivation of results to follow we refrain from substituting Θ = Θ∗ in equation (35).
26Bjorvatn and Schjelderup (2002) in a model with identical countries, tax competition and interna-
tional public goods ﬁnd that when international spillovers are perfect (in our case Θ =1 ), there is no
incentive for tax competition. This is true in our model too since in this case mobile and immobile
factors are taxed at the same rate.
27Setting Θ =1and ρN = ρ∗N = µ = µ∗ in equation (20) we get that dr
dρ < 0 implying that b ρ>µ .
In addition, note that the Nash capital income tax rates in sections 5.1 and 5.2 are also lower than the
net pollution minimizing rate.
17monotonic relationship between Θ and ρN with the value of ρN going from 0 to µ,a s
Θ increases from 0 to 1. In other words, as the rate of cross-border pollution increases
simultaneously in both countries, the Nash capital income tax rates also increase. On the
other hand, equation (35) shows that starting from Θ = Θ∗ and assuming that Pg = t,
an increase in Θ, while Θ∗ is kept constant, increases the Home’s capital income tax, i.e.,
(∂ρN/∂Θ) > 0.28 The following proposition summarizes these results:
Proposition 5 When the two countries are identical in every respect and Θ = Θ∗ then
1) ρN = ρ∗N = µ = µ∗ if Θ = Θ∗ =1
2) ρN = ρ∗N =
−Θµ 
1−Θ(1+ ) > 0 if Pg = t and a simultaneous increase in Θ and Θ∗
increases ρN and ρ∗N.
3) If Pg = t,a ni n c r e a s ei nΘ,w i t hΘ∗ constant, increases ρN ((∂ρN/∂Θ) > 0).29
5.4 kf > 0,a n dΘ = Θ∗ =0
In this case we study the Nash capital tax rates in the presence of capital mobility between
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From equations (37) and (38) we observe that in the absence of pollution, i.e., RtK =
R∗
t∗K∗ =0 ,o rw h e nPg = t and P∗
g∗ = t∗, we get the standard results that ρN > 0 and
ρ∗N < 0.30 The presence of local pollution and public pollution abatement increase
ρ∗N when Pg >tand P∗
g∗ >t ∗. In other words, the Nash optimal policy for Foreign
can be a lower subsidy or even a tax.31 However, the presence of local pollution and
public pollution abatement have an ambiguous eﬀect on ρN. The Nash optimal policy
28Note that this is a partial equilibrium result since we assume that all other variables remain constant
when Θ changes.
29Rauscher (1997) ﬁnds the same result but from the point of view of a single country. The present
analysis shows that this is not a general result.
30In this case equations (37) and (38) reduce to the corresponding equations in Hatzipanayotou, Had-
jiyiannis, and Michael (2002). They show that if 0 <ρ N < 1 then ρ∗N < 0. DePater and Myers (1994)
and Peralta and Van Ypersele (2003) also demonstrate that ρN > 0 and ρ∗N < 0.
31Note that the ﬁrst two terms in the numerator of equation (38) are positive.
18for Home can be a lower or higher capital income tax or even a subsidy.32 The following
Proposition summarizes these results:
Proposition 6 In the absence of cross-border pollution, i.e., Θ = Θ∗ =0 ,a n di fPg >t
and P∗
g∗ >t ∗ then the presence of local pollution and public pollution abatement increase
ρ∗N and have an ambiguous eﬀect on ρN.
Therefore, in the presence of local pollution and public pollution abatement it is even
possible to have a reversal of the standard results. In other words, it is possible to have
a capital income subsidy for the capital importing country and a capital income tax for
the capital exporting country.
6C o n c l u s i o n s
To date the literature on the interaction between taxes on factors income and environ-
mental quality remains thin, despite voluminous parallel literatures on tax competition
and on the impact of international capital mobility on the quality of the environment.
This paper contributes in that direction by examining the impact of these income taxes
on net pollution and welfare and by deriving their Nash optimal rates. We construct
a model of a regional block comprising two non-identical countries with capital mobil-
ity, cross-border pollution and public sector abatement of pollution. Governments take
pollution taxes as given and ﬁnance their public pollution abatement activities using
pollution and income tax revenue.
Within this framework we demonstrate, among other things, that there exists a cap-
ital income tax rate which maximizes each country’s public sector pollution abatement
activity. For a small emissions tax this capital income tax is positive. We also derive the
capital income tax that minimizes net pollution and show that when the two countries
are identical this rate is positive. In addition, we ﬁnd that an increase in a country’s tax
rate on immobile factors’ income unambiguously raises public sector abatement activity
and thus it reduces net pollution, since it simply entails a transfer of non-capital income
to the government.
Assuming that the two countries act non-cooperatively, we show that the Nash equi-
librium tax rates on immobile factors’ income require optimal provision of public sector
32Note that the ﬁrst term in the numerator of equation (37) is positive, while the second is negative.
19pollution abatement. We show that, under reasonable assumptions, the presence of lo-
cal pollution and public pollution abatement reduce the Nash capital income subsidy of
the capital exporting country and have an ambiguous eﬀect on the Nash capital income
tax of the capital importing country. In fact, it is possible for the standard result of
the tax competition literature to be reversed, i.e. it is possible to have a Nash capital
income subsidy for the capital importing country and a capital income tax for the capital
exporting country. In the presence of cross-border pollution we ﬁnd that, in many cases,
the optimal capital income policy is a positive tax for both the capital importing and
the capital exporting countries. Moreover, we ﬁnd that in most cases the Nash capital
income tax rate is lower than the net pollution minimizing rate.
When the two countries are identical in every respect we show that the capital income
tax rate is not greater than the Nash tax rate on immobile factors income and is increasing
in the degree of cross-border pollution. In addition, when the degree of cross-border
pollution is at its maximum, then the Nash taxes on mobile and immobile factors’ income
are the same. Also, in the absence of cross-border pollution and when pollution taxes
are equal to the cost of the public pollution abatement good, the Nash capital income
taxes are zero. Thus, the Nash capital income taxes are set to account for the existence
of cross-border pollution.
20Appendix A: The Model

     







00 tRtK − ρRK − (ρ − µ)KRKK Pg 0






     





































































where UK = Er(ΘR∗
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21Appendix B: Nash Capital Income Taxes
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